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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Does §l52(e)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code bar state 
courts from ordering a custodial parent to execute documents 
necessary for the non-custodial parent to claim a dependent tax 
exemption? 
2. Did the Court of Appeals err in ordering that both 
parties bear their own attorneys' fees on appeal given that neither 
party prevailed on appeal and plaintiff has substantial resources 
from which to pay her attorneys' fees? 
OPINION OF THE LOWER COURT 
Plaintiff petitions for certiorari of the opinion of the Court 
of Appeals of Utah in the matter of Motes v. Motes, 121 Ut. Adv. Rpt. 
50, 786 P. 2d 232 (Nov. 6, 1989) rehearing denied, (Jan. 29, 1990). 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdictioh over the Petition for 
Certiorari pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §§78-2-3(a) and 78-2a-4 
(1987) 
APPLICABLE AUTHORITY 
1. 26 U. S. c. §152(e)(2) (1988). A child of parents 
described in paragraph JS152/eJU / D shall be treated as having 
received over half of his support during a calendar year from the 
noncustodial parent if: 
(A) the custodial parent signs a written declaration (in 
such manner and form as the Secretary may be regulations 
prescribe) that such custodial parent will not claim such 
- 1 -
child as a dependent for any taxable year beginning in such 
calendar year, and 
(B) the noncustodial parent attaches such written 
declaration to the noncustodial parent' s return for the 
taxable year beginning during such calendar year. 
2. Utah Code Annotated §30-3-3 (1989). The court may order 
either party to pay the clerk a sum of money for the separate 
support and maintenance of the adverse party and the children, and 
to enable such party to prosecute or defend the action. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The instant case was initiated by plaintiff s Verified 
Complaint for Divorce, which was filed in the Third Judicial 
District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah on April 23, 
1986. Defendant filed an Answer and Counterclaim for Divorce on 
March 19, 1987. The case was tried on July 30, 1987 before the 
Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, Third District Court Judge. Defendant 
appeared in person and through counsel. Plaintiff appeared pro-
se, as her counsel had withdrawn shortly before trial (R. 151; R. 
239, Tr. July 30, 1987, at p. 3). 
At the time of trial, the parties stipulated to division of 
the majority of household goods and personal property. In 
addition, the parties agreed to allege irreconcilable differences 
as the grounds for divorce and defendant agreed that custody of the 
parties' minor children could remain with the plaintiff. 
The principle issues that were contested at trial include: 
1. Division of the defendant' s military retirement; 
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2. Division of the plaintiff s inheritance and the 
appreciation thereon; and 
3. Award of child support and alimony. 
On those issues, the trial court: 
1. Ordered the defendant to pay child support of $175. 00 per 
month for each of the parties' three minor children for a total of 
$525. 00 (Findings and Conclusions at p. 6, para. 5; Decree at p. 
6, para. 5). l 
2. Awarded each party $1.00 per year as alimony (Findings 
and Conclusions at p. 7, para. 9; Decree at page 3, para. 9). 
3. Ruled that both the $140,000.00 inherited by plaintiff 
and the $32, 384. 00 generated in part from the defendant' s 
investment of the inheritance were not assets of the marital 
estate. Therefore neither of those funds were divided between the 
parties (Findings and Conclusions at p. 12 and 15, paras. 26 and 
37; Decree at pp. 3 and 10-11, paras. 26 and 37). 
4. Ruled that division of the retirement benefits accrued 
by both plaintiff and defendant be postponed until defendant' s 
support obligation was satisfied—after the parties' last child 
reached the age of majority or graduated from high school (Findings 
and Conclusions at page 14, para 35; Decree at p. 10, para. 35). 
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered in 
this case are pages 190-205 of the record on appeal. For the 
court' s convenience, the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
are attached to this brief as Exhibit "A" and are cited herein as 
"Findings and Conclusions." The Decree of Divorce, record pages 
206-219, is attached hereto as Exhibit "B" and cited as "Decree." 
- ^ -
5. Ruled that defendant should be permitted to take a tax 
exemption for the parties' youngest child so long as he remained 
current in his support obligation and, therefore, ordered the 
plaintiff to execute the documents necessary to permit the 
defendant to claim that exemption (Findings and Conclusions at page 
7, para. 6; Decree at p. 2, para 6). 
Plaintiff appealed the trial court' s decision, contesting the 
deferral of division of the defendant' s retirement plan and the 
trial court's decision to award one federal income tax exemption 
to the defendant. Plaintiff requested an award of attorneys' fees 
on appeal. 
Defendant filed a cross-appeal, contesting the trial court' s 
determination that the appreciation earned on plaintiff s 
inheritance was not marital property despite the fact that the 
trial court also found that the appreciation was, at least in part, 
attributable to defendant' s services. 
Judges Orme, Billings and Greenwood, sitting for the Court of 
Appeals held that: 
1. "The retirement plans of both parties should have been 
treated as marital assets and definitively dealt with in a Decree 
as part of an equitable property distribution between the parties." 
Motes v. Motes, 786 P. 2d 232, 235. 
2. "The Court's distribution of the parties' properties and 
award of child support was inextricably linked. The court should 
reconsider disposition of the proceeds earned on the plaintiff s 
inheritance by virtue of defendant' s services and the award of 
- A -
child support upon remand. " Id. The Court noted that it would not 
"necessarily be inappropriate to award defendant's share of the 
inheritance profits to plaintiff in exchange for the retirement 
benefits to which she would otherwise be entitled. " 786 P. 2d at 
235, n. 3 
3. Section 152(e)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code does not 
prohibit a state court from ordering a custodial parent to execute 
documents necessary to allow the non-custodial to claim a dependent 
exemption for federal income tax purposes. 786 P. 2d at 240. 
Plaintiff then filed a petition for rehearing arguing that the 
Court of Appeals should remand the case to the trial court only to 
allow the trial court to divide the parties' retirement accounts 
and to determine an appropriate award of attorneys' fees in favor 
of plaintiff. Plaintiff also argued that the court should 
reconsider its decision on the tax exemption issue as the decision 
conflicted with the Court of Appeals decisions in Martinez v. 
Martinez, 754 P. 2d 69 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), cert, granted, 765 P. 2d 
1277 (Utah 1988); and Fullmer v. Fullmer, 761 P. 2d 942 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988). The Court of Appeals denied the petition for 
rehearing. See, Motes v. Motes, 786 P. 2d at 240. 
The plaintiff s petition for certiorari asks that this Court 
review the Court of Appeals decision insofar as it affirms the 
trial court' s decision to order the plaintiff to execute documents 
necessary to allow defendant to claim one child as an exemption for 
federal tax purposes and denies plaintiff s requests for attorneys' 
fees. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The parties were the only witnesses called at trial. 
Testimony relevant to the issues now on appeal established the 
following facts: 
The defendant joined the United States Army, as a private, 
on June 21, 1960, and a year later obtained an appointment to the 
United States Military Academy at West Point (R. 239, Tr. July 30, 
1987, at p. 66). The defendant graduated from the military academy 
in June of 1965 with a Bachelor of Science Degree in engineering 
(R. 239, Tr. July 30, 1987, at pp. 50-51). The parties were 
married on February 11, 1967, (R. 239, Tr. July 30, 1987, at p. 
66). In 1977, while serving in the military, the defendant 
obtained a Masters of Business Administration from the University 
of Utah (R. 239, Tr. July 30, 1987, at p. 50). 
Defendant retired from the military in June of 1984 (R. 239, 
Tr. July 30, 1987, at p. 66). Upon retirement, defendant began 
receiving monthly payments from his military pension, which net him 
approximately $1, 149. 00 per month (R. 239, Tr. July 30, 1987, at 
p. 67). After leaving the military, he began working in the area 
of financial planning (R. 239, Tr. July 30, 1987, at p. 69). Due 
to difficulties in establishing a clientele and generating a return 
on investments, at the time of the divorce the defendant7 s business 
was operating at a net monthly loss of income (R. 2 3 9, Tr. July 30, 
1987, at pp. 90-91). The defendant's income also includes a monthly 
payment of $315. 00 received pursuant to a contract for the sale of 
the parties' home in El Paso, Texas and approximately $11.83 per 
- A _ 
month in interest and dividends (R. 239, Tr. July 30, 1987, at p. 
6). Thus, the defendant's net monthly income at the time of the 
divorce was approximately $1,475.83. The majority of that income 
is the income from the pension and, as the defendant testified, he 
needs that income for his living expenses (R. 239, Tr. July 27, 
1987 at p. 72). 
The plaintiff completed her nursing education and began 
working on her Master7 s Degree during the parties' marriage (R. 
239, Tr. July 30, 1987, at p. 191). At the time of trial, she was 
taking non-credit courses and estimated, at that rate, it would 
take her five or six years to finish the Master' s program (R. 239, 
Tr. July 30, 1987, at pp. 51-53). She started working for the 
University of Utah Medical Center in 1980. She is now a nursing 
supervisor at the University of Utah Medical Center, in charge of 
approximately 650 employees and she testified that her Master' s 
training would assist her in advancing in her career (R. 239, Tr. 
July 30, 1987, at pp. 52-56). The plaintiff had, at the time of 
the divorce, a gross monthly income of $2,205.00 and a net income 
of approximately $1,745.00 (R. 239, Tr. July 30, 1987, at p. 6). 
In December of 1985, the plaintiff inherited approximately 
$100,000.00 (R. 239, Tr. July 30, 1987, at p. 38). She gave 
$60,000.00 to the defendant to invest for the parties' children 
(R. 239, Tr. July 30, 1987, at p. 38). In February of 1985, 
plaintiff inherited approximately another $40,000.00 in cash (R. 
239, Tr. July 30, 1987, at p. 41), and the defendant invested an 
additional $20,000.00. At the time of divorce, the $80,000.00 
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invested by the defendant had increased to $112,384.00; a gain of 
$32,384.00 (R. 239, Tr. July 30, 1987 at p. 39 and 49). 
The parties separated in April of 1986. At the time of trial, 
plaintiff was 44 years of age and defendant was 45 years of age (R. 
239, Tr. July 30, 1987, at p. 5). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT OF APPEALS IN THIS CASE FOR THE FIRST TIME ADDRESSED 
WHETHER A TRIAL COURT MAY ORDER A CUSTODIAL PARENT TO 
EXECUTE DOCUMENTS NECESSARY TO ALLOW THE NON-CUSTODIAL PARENT 
TO CLAIM A DEPENDENT TAX EXEMPTION. THE COURT OF APPEALS 
CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT NOTHING IN THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE 
BARS SUCH AN ORDER 
Plaintiff argues that this Court should grant her petition 
for certiorari to review the Court of Appeals decision confirming 
the trial court' s order requiring plaintiff to execute documents 
necessary under §152(e)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code to permit 
defendant to claim one dependent tax exemption for federal income 
tax purposes. Plaintiff asserts that the decision in Motes 
conflicts with the Court of Appeals' earlier decisions in Fullmer 
v. Fullmer and Martinez v. Martinez. The plaintiff argues that the 
inconsistency in the decisions of Martinez, Fullmer, and Motes 
creates uncertainty and "result[s] in a total absence of guidance 
as to what the state of the law is in Utah relative to allocation 
of tax exemptions. " See, Plaintiff s Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari at page 14. 
The great weight of plaintiff s argument rests not in the 
decisions of the Court of Appeals in Martinez or Fullmer but upon 
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the underlying facts of the Martinez case which are nowhere 
addressed in the Court of Appeals decision in Martinez. Therefore, 
plaintiff s argument is that the Court of Appeals should have 
addressed in Martinez the issue of whether a court may order a 
custodial parent to execute forms permitting a non-custodial parent 
tax exemption. The fact is that the Court of Appeals did not 
address that issue in Martinez. Instead, the Court of Appeals held 
that a temporary stipulation and separation agreement distributing 
the parties' dependent tax exemptions was not a "qualified pre-1985 
instrument" as that term is defined under §152(e)(4) of the 
Internal Revenue Code that would justify an exception to the 
general rule that the custodial parent is entitled to tax 
exemptions for dependent children. 7 54 P. 2d at 72. The Martinez 
court noted that the defendant failed to establish any other 
exception to the general rule and concluded, therefore, that the 
custodial parent was entitled to the tax exemption. Id. 
In Fullmer, the trial court awarded the respondent a dependent 
tax exemption when the court changed the award of custody provided 
in the original divorce decree and awarded custody of the dependent 
to the respondent. 761 P.2d at 945. The Court of Appeals stayed 
the order changing custody and ultimately reversed that order and 
the appellant remained the custodial parent. 761 P. 2d at 950. 
The appellant had signed no waiver allowing Respondent' s claim to 
the parties' child as a tax exemption and, apparently, the Court 
had not ordered the custodial parent to execute such a waiver. Id. 
Consequently, the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court 
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erred in awarding the non-custodial parent a tax exemption for the 
parties' child. Id. 
In sum, as the Court of Appeals admits in its decision in 
Motes, while Fullmer and Martinez both address the issue of an 
award of a dependent tax exemption for federal tax purposes, 
neither case directly addresses the issue of whether a trial court 
may order the custodial parent to execute a wavier as permitted 
under §152(e)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code as an exception to 
the general rule that a custodial parent is entitled to the tax 
exemption. Motes v. Motes, 786 P. 2d at 235. The Court of Appeals 
in Motes proceeded to remedy its omissions in Martinez and Fullmer 
with an analysis of legislative history and case authority that is 
sufficiently complete to render the opinion the equivalent of a law 
review article on the topic of whether a court may order a 
custodial parent to waive a dependent tax exemption. 786 P.2d at 
236-239. 
As a result of that analysis, the Court of Appeals concluded 
that:2 (1) nothing in the language of 26 U. S.C. §152(e)(2) 
prohibits a trial court from ordering the custodial parent to 
execute a waiver of a dependent tax exemption. 786 P. 2d at 236; 
(2) the purpose behind §152(e)(2) is satisfied so long as a court 
orders a custodial parent to execute a wavier of right to a tax 
exemption when allocating the exemption to the non-custodial 
Defendant herein presents only a brief synopsis of the 
Court of Appeals decision. The decision is attached as Exhibit 
parent, id. at 236-237; (3) the "vast majority of other 
jurisdictions" that have confronted this issue have "concluded that 
state courts retain the authority to order the custodial parent to 
execute" a waiver of their dependent tax exemption. 3 Id. at 237, 
The Court of Appeals did not conclude that trial courts have 
unfettered discretion in ordering a custodial parent to waive their 
dependent tax exemption, in allocating dependent exemptions. 
Instead, the court found that there must exist exceptional 
circumstances that justify allocation of tax exemptions to the non-
custodial parent and noted that the trial court must make specific 
findings that such exceptional circumstances exist. The court did 
not determine whether the trial court7 s findings were sufficient 
in the instant case to support its allocation of the parties 
dependent exemptions. Indeed, as noted by the Court of Appeals, 
it would have been superfluous for the court to have made such an 
analysis as the entire matter has been remanded to the trial court 
for "extensive reassessment of property and support questions." 
Id. at 240. 
In sum, the Court of Appeals holding in Motes is that, under 
some circumstances, it may be permissible for a trial court to 
While the Court of Appeals chose to follow the majority 
position, the court acknowledged that a minority of the courts hold 
that §152(e)(2) prohibits the trial court from ordering a custodial 
parent to execute a waiver of their tax exemption. 786 P.2d at 
238. The Court of Appeals rejected the minority view because the 
court concluded that the majority position was more soundly based 
in law and more equitable in practice. Id. at 239. Based upon 
those conclusions, the court held that a trial court may order a 
custodial parent to execute the documents necessary to waive their 
right to a dependent tax exemption. 
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order a custodial parent to execute a waiver of a dependent tax 
exemption and nothing in the Internal Revenue Code prohibits such 
an order. 
Far from confusing the state of the lav/ of allocation of tax 
exemptions in Utah, the Court of Appeals' thorough analysis finally 
puts the issue to rest. Consequently, defendant respectfully 
requests that plaintiff s Petition for Writ of Certiorari be denied 
and that this matter be permitted to proceed, once again, toward 
the goal of reaching a resolution of the parties' divorce dispute 
in the trial court pursuant to the Order of the Court of Appeals. 
Plaintiff argues "parenthetically" that the Uniform Child 
Support Guidelines now in place were developed based upon 
calculations that assume exemptions are granted to the custodial 
parent. See Petition to the Supreme Court of Utah for a Writ of 
Certiorari. Those child support guidelines were not in effect when 
the trial court reached its decision on child support in this case. 
Therefore plaintiff s argument is not persuasive in this case. 
Moreover, while the child support guidelines certainly support a 
presumption that, under ordinary circumstances, dependent 
exemptions should be awarded to the custodial parent, the 
guidelines are not a basis for the conclusion that even where 
exceptional circumstances exist, the trial court has no power to 
order the custodial parent to waive a tax exemption so that the 
non-custodial parent may claim the benefit of that exemption. Such 
an absolute bar may lead to results that are actually detrimental 
to both parents and the dependent child. For instance, if the non-
custodial parent' s income is larger than contemplated under the 
child support guidelines, the non-custodial parent may well receive 
the greatest benefit from the dependent tax exemption. Therefore 
trial courts will be faced with the practical choice of either 
allocating the exemption to the non-custodial parent and increasing 
child support so that both parties and the child benefit from that 
exemption or leaving the exemption in place with the custodial 
parent and decreasing the child support obligation to offset the 
income lost to taxes. 
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POINT II. 
THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT ERR IN DETERMINING THAT AN 
AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES WAS NOT WARRANTED IN THE INSTANT CASE. 
Plaintiff argues that she is entitled to an award of 
attorneys' fees because she "prevailed" in a case at the Court of 
Appeals. Even assuming that allegation were correct, the rule in 
this state is not that a party that prevails on appeal is entitled 
to attorneys' fees. Instead, an award of attorneys' fees is 
authorized under Utah Code Annotated §30-3-3 (1989) and is 
justified on the basis of financial need. Maughn v. Maughn, 770 
P. 2d 156, 162 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P. 2d 
1331, 1337 (Utah App. 1988). In the instant case, plaintiff left 
the parties' marriage in a much better financial position than 
defendant. Plaintiff had both a higher monthly income than 
defendant and, because of her inheritance which exceeds one hundred 
thousand dollars, she has much greater financial reserves. Under 
those circumstances, if an award of attorneys' fees were to be 
made, it should have been to the defendant. 
Moreover, if the rule were that the prevailing party on appeal 
is entitled to attorneys' fees, the Court of Appeals in this case 
would have been faced with an interesting conundrum. In this case, 
the plaintiff prevailed in her argument that the parties retirement 
funds should be immediately distributed. On the other hand, the 
Court of Appeals, almost as an aside, also disagreed with the trial 
court' s ruling that the appreciation on the fund inherited by 
plaintiff was not marital property subject to distribution. 786 
_ 1 *5 -
P. 2d at 235. Thus, the defendant also prevailed on his cross-
appeal. Consequently, in this case, both parties won on appeal, 
or more accurately in this case, both parties lost. The parties 
remain in conflict, although their divorce was initiated four (4) 
years ago and they have been divorced in excess of three (3) years. 
Plaintiff has the financial resources to continue with this 
conflict if she chooses to do so. An award of attorneys' fees is 
not necessary to allow the plaintiff to pursue her action. 
Instead, an award of attorneys' fees in this case would be a 
punitive measure which would accomplish little more than adding 
fuel to a fire that should have long since died. 
Consequently, defendant respectfully requests that this Court 
deny the Plaintiff s Petition for Writ of Certiorari on the Court 
of Appeals decision to require both parties to bear their own costs 
on appeal. 
DATED this day of April, 1990. 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
^JULIE A. /feRYAN 
Attorney for Respondent/Cross -
Appellant 
The Court of Appeals noted that it "may be proper to award 
defendant' s share of the inheritance profits to the plaintiff in 
exchange for retirement benefits to which she would otherwise be 
entitled" and adopted authority cited by defendant in a supplement 
to his respondent' s brief for the proposition that the growth in 
the inherited funds may be marital property subject to division. 
786 P. 2d at 235, n. 3. 
_ 1 A _ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the ^C^ day of April, 1990 I mailed 
four (4) a true and correct copies of the foregoing to: 
Kent Kasting 
DART, ADAMSON & KASTING 
310 South Main 
Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(td/jab/motes) 
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E X H I B I T "lA1 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ (0899) 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * 
BARBARA MOTES, ) 
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Plaintiff, ) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs. ) 
) Civil No. D86-1615 
PRESTON MOTES, ) 
) Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
Defendant. ) 
* * * * * * * * 
The above-entitled matter came before the court for 
trial on Thursday, the 30th day of July, 1987, the Honorable 
Kenneth Rigtrup presiding. The plaintiff was present in person, 
representing herself. The defendant was present in person and 
represented by counsel, David S. Dolowitz. The court discussed 
the issues with the parties to see what could be resolved by 
agreement, then heard and considered the testimony of the par-
ties, examined the exhibits offered by the parties, and, being 
advised in the premises, now makes and enters the following as 
its 
RLED IN CLERK'S Oj^CE 
Salt Lake Countv l uan 
HPC211987 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The parties were both residents of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on the date this action was filed and each 
had been so for more than three months immediately prior thereto. 
2. The parties are husband and wife, having been mar-
ried February 11, 1967, in Ardmore, Pennsylvania. 
3. There have been four children born as issue of 
this marriage, three of whom, Kimberly, age 16, born October 19, 
1970; Tamara, age 14, born October 5, 1972; and Charissa, age 13, 
born December 27, 1973, are minors. 
4. The parties agreed that care, custody and control 
of the minor children of the parties should be awarded to the 
plaintiff, subject to liberal rights of visitation by the 
defendant. 
5. The plaintiff is 44 years of age, is presently 
employed as a nursing supervisor, where she supervises more than 
650 employees at the University of Utah Hospital and earns a 
gross income of $2,205.00 per month. 
6. The plaintiff acquired her nursing education dur-
ing the course of the marriage. 
7. The defendant is 45 years of age, a graduate of 
the United States Military Academy at West Point and has an 
M.B.A. earned from the University of Utah acquired during the 
marriage. He is presently retired from the United States Mili-
tary and receives $1,484.00 a month as retirement pay. In 
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addition, he receives $315.00 a month as payment on a note for 
the sale of property owned by the parties in El Pasof Texas, and 
has earned, on an average basis, commissions from his employer, 
Waddell & Reed, as a financial planner, $248.00 a month. He has 
incurred expenses in conducting his business at Waddell & Reed of a*u/^ul^ 
A 
$330.00 a month. 
8. In February, 1985, the plaintiff's father died. 
When the parties went to the home that he had occupied, they 
found and removed from the home $30,000.00 in cash. The 
plaintiff's father made plaintiff his sole heir and she has 
inherited the said $30,000.00 in cash at the time of her father's 
death, $100,000.00 in December, 1985; $7,500.00 in November, 
1986; and $3,000.00 in December, 1986, for a total of 
$140,500.00. The estate has not been finally distributed, but 
most of it has been disbursed. 
9. After the parties removed the $30,000.00 from the 
plaintiff's father's home, $20,000.00 was given to the defendant 
by the plaintiff to invest for their children and accounts were 
opened up in the sum of $5,000.00 for each of the four children 
"of the parties. After the $100,000.00 payment had been 
received, an additional $10,000.00 was set aside for each of the 
children of the parties. There are, now, $15,000.00 plus earn-
ings in the accounts of each of the children of the parties for a 
total of $60,000 plus earnings. 
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10. The parties acquired a home and real property at 
1516 South Wasatch Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah, in which they 
have accumulated an equity of ^O^O1/ A-23.00; a note from the sale of 
property in El Paso, Texas, valued at $35,000.00; IRA accounts, 
in the United Funds, $17,350.00; Continental, $8,000.00; 
Magelland Fund, $19,083.00; stock accounts in the Fidelity Des-
tiny Fund, $41,263.00; shares of stock in AT&T and the other Bell 
companies plus accumulated reinvested dividends presently valued 
at $3,800.00; an account at Wilson-Davis for various penny stocks 
valued at $50.00; a 1980 Oldsmobile, valued at/$*w«*; a 1982 
Volvo automobile, valued" at/ ^ ^^SFSSS} a 1986 Jetta automobile, 
valued at^$7,000.00W a fund for payment of taxes in the Vanguard 
Fund of $1,149.00; and an Army Mutual Aid Insurance Policy with a 
present cash value of $3,100.00. 
11. The plaintiff has a retirement account through her 
employment at the University of Utah Hospital with a present 
vjpuac e€ $5,129.00; her own checking account at the Credit Union 
for the balance of $7,6 80.00, and a Pentagon Credit Union Account 
with a balance of $3,721.00. 
12. The defendant has a savings account at the Air 
Defense Center Credit Union of $375.00; a checking account 
through the Air Defense Center Credit Union of $1,000.00; a Pen-
tagon Credit Union Account of $275.00; and checking account at 
First Security Bank of $500.00. 
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13, The parties have fought for a substantial period 
of time and have demonstrated that there are irreconcilable dif-
ferences between them in terms of their goals, values and how 
they treat each other, which make continuation of their marriage 
relationship impossible. 
14. The defendant invested a portion of the money 
inherited by the plaintiff and imr investments have produced 
earnings'-^ $32,384.00. 
15. Both of the parties disposed of assets during the 
pendency of this matter. 
16. The plaintiff is presently enrolled in school, as 
well as being employed and hopes to obtain a Master's Degree 
which she believes will be necessary to further her nursing 
career. 
17. The court discussed with the parties division of 
their personal property from a list prepared by the defendant and 
they agreed to divide the personal items between them as is here-
inafter set out. up, . 
18. The plaintiff desires that her/name be changed to 
Barbara Van Asdlan. 
19. Each of the parties employed counsel to represent 
them in this matter. Counsel for the plaintiff withdrew shortly 
before the trial and the plaintiff chose to represent herself, 
rather than employ new counsel. 
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From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court now 
makes and enters the following 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Each of the parties should be awarded a Decree of 
Divorce from the other, said Decrees to become final upon entry. 
2. Care, custody and control of the minor children of 
the parties should be awarded to the plaintiff, subject to lib-
eral rights of visitation by the defendant. 
3. The defendant and the children are to work out 
their own visitation arrangements upon 24-hour advance notice 
with which the plaintiff should not interfere. 
4. Each of the parties should be enjoined and prohib-
ited from deTTG%at±ftg the other to the children or taking any 
action to involve the children in their disputes. Each should be 
supportive of the other as the parent of the children. 
5. The defendant should be ordered to pay the sum of 
$175.00 per child per month as child support for each of the 
children until that child attains the age of 18 and/or graduates 
from high school with his or her age-appropriate class. The 
defendant should be enjoined from placing any initials or com-
ments on the checks;J^ One-half of the child support should be 
paid on or before the 5th of each month and one-half should be 
paid on or before the 20th of each month. This order regarding 
child support should become effective August 1, 1987. 
-6-
6. The defendant should bet awarded the youngest child , c 
of the parties, Charissa, as his tax dependent,! and -he plaintiffs £& ^w* <*L 
should be ordered to sign all documents required by the Internal "^ tP'^ *'? 
Revenue Service to effect this award. 
7. All child support payments from and after the 
entry of the Decree of Divorce in this matter should be made 
through the clerk of the Salt Lake County Court. 
8. A withhold and deliver order should be authorized 
to be executed should the defendant fall more than 30 days behind 
in the payment of his child support. 
9. Each of the parties is awarded $1.00 per year as 
alimony from the other. 
10. Each of the parties should be ordered to retain 
their existing life insurance policies for the minor children of 
the parties until child support for the youngest child 
terminates. 
11. Each party should be ordered to maintain such 
health, accident, dental, orthodontic and hospital insurance as 
they have available to them through their employment for the ben-
efit of the minor children of the parties for so long as they may 
provide such insurance protection under the terms and conditions 
of the applicable insurance policies and each should be ordered 
to pay one-half of any uninsured medical,/ dental, hospital or 
orthodontic expenses. 
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12. The plaintiff should have her name ^ateee to the 
name of Van Asdlan. 
13. Each of the parties should be ordered to sign all 
documents and take all actions necessary to effect the provisions 
of the Decree of Divorce. 
14. The agreement of the parties regarding division of 
their personal property should be accepted by the court and, 
accordingly, the defendant is awarded, and the plaintiff should 
be ordered to deliver to the defendant, the following items: 
a. The bedroom set located in the master bed-
room, including the king-sized bed, chest, dresser, mirrors and 
nightstands; 
b. One of the large down comforters; 
c. His West Point blanket; 
d. The two table lamps with the tripod-type 
base; 
room; 
The sofa and loveseat located in the family 
f. The glass-topped table in the family room 
used as an endtable for the sofa; 
g. The clay table lamp on the glass-topped 
table; 
h. The large Sand painting given as a birthday 
present to the defendant; 
i. The Frace eagle over the fireplace; 
j. The Ray Harm eagle print; 
k. The silver West Point plate; 
1. The two pen and ink drawings of Landstuhl; 
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The West Point print; 
The "Old Man" painting; 
Six of the etchings; 
The Merimbege River painting; 
Two of the Hughes paintings; 
Two large Sansui speakers; 
Two channel tape drive; 
Two Kenwood speakers; 
Pioneer tuner; 
Phonograph turntable; 
AKAI tapedeck (two channel); 
Two of the three wall clocks; 
Apple computer, printer and software; 
The flower set of Franciscan china; 
The Sango china; 
The set of Nachmann whisky beakers; 
The Rosenthal crystal; 
Copper pots and pans; 
Pewterware; plates, cups, goblets, pitcher, 
Table linens to include one of the Army-Navy 
Desk in the laundry room; 
The old green table from "Pops;" 
One cardtable with one round piece of glass 
piece; 
The Flokoti rugs and brass samovar; 
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11. The National Geographic books and magazines 
and the bookcase in the study; 
mm. Handtools and power tools; 
nn. The aquarium; 
oo. All of Defendant's personal clothing and 
items, including uniforms; 
pp. All items purchased by Defendant before mar-
riage to include textbooks and records; 
qq. Remainder of the flatware set; 
rr. Balance of Defendant's business records. 
ss. Large china hutch obtained from P. D. 0. in 
Germany; 
15. The plaintiff should be specifically awarded 
a. The Gieol painting; 
b. Two Bassett paintings; 
c. The four-channel tape drive; 
d. Two bookcase speakers (Pioneer); 
e. SANSUI tuner; 
f. Grundig console and six speakers; 
g. AKAI tape deck (larger); 
h. Cassette deck; 
i. One of the three wall clocks; 
j. Pewter candlesticks; 
k. French hutch; 
1. Twelve Hummel figurines; 
m. One set of tools for use around the house/; AU/p AA****^ 
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16. The defendant should be ordered :o make available 
to the plaintiff any records that the plaintiff shall request so 
that they can be reproduced on a cassette, cbjjf******^ ^ ^ ** "T^J?**? 
"^ ' 17. Each of the parties should be awarded all items of 
personal^ property in his/her possession not hereinabove 
specified. 
18. The defendant should be ordered to make available 
to the plaintiff any picturesf photographs or slides which she 
wishes duplicated and those will be duplicated at her expense. 
19. The plaintiff should be awarded all of the 
accounts of the children established with funds from the 
plaintiff's inheritance and the right and obligation to manage 
those accounts, and the defendant should be ordered to take 
appropriate steps to turn those over to the plaintiff. 
20. All right, title and interest in the home on 
Wasatch Drive should be awarded to the plaintiff, free of any 
interest of the defendant, subject to her payment of the first 
mortgage and payment of the debt and obligation of approximately 
$4,000.00 due to the Pentagon Credit Union and approximately 
$3,500.00 to the Norwest Credit Union. The plaintiff should be 
responsible for these obligations from and after August 1, 1987, 
and should be ordered to hold the defendant harmless therefrom. 
21. The Trinidad note should be awarded to the defen-
dant, free and clear of any claim of the plaintiff. 
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22. Each of the parties should be awarded one of the 
Horizon lots which have no present value. 
23. The defendant should be awarded the interest of 
the parties in the United funds IRA Account; the Fidelity Destiny 
Fund; the Wilson-Davis Account; the Army Mutual Aid Insurance 
Policy; the Air Defense Center Savings account; the Air Defense 
Center checking account; his Pentagon Credit Union account; and 
Defendant's First Security checking account. 
24. The plaintiff should be awarded the Continental 
IRA account; the Magellan fund; the family AT&T stock; her 
accounts at the University of Utah Credit Union; and Plaintiff's 
Pentagon Credit Union account. 
25. The defendant should be awarded the 1980 
Oldsmobile and the plaintiff should be awarded the 1982 Volvo and 
the 1986 Jetta. * 
26. Thef/$32,384.00 earned by •4sho-xhif ondant through hisr 
Nr- trv\ 
•ma'rraf^tfreft-fc—©pff the property inherited by the plaintiff should be 
considered a non-asset of the marriage. 
27. The defendant shall obtain from Sears a statement 
of the account balance due as of May 1, 1986. He is credited 
with having paid $140.00 on that account. Each of the parties 
shall be obligated to pay one-half of that account balance. If, 
after deduction of the $140.00 paid by the defendant, there is 
any money due below $140.00, that should be paid by the plain-
tiff. If the amount due, after credit of the $140.00 is more 
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than $140.00, the defendant snould pay that sum to the plaintiff 
or judgment shall be entered in her favor for one-half of the 
balance over $280,00. If the defendant, by paying $140.00 shall 
have paid more than one-half of the amount that was due on May 1, 
1986f the amount by which he has exceeded payment of one-half of 
the balance due should be a credit against the child support he 
shall have been ordered to pay. 
28. If there are orthodontic bills due which have not 
been paid by insurance, each of the parties should pay one-half 
of that unpaid balance and one-half of any counseling bills 
incurred for and on behalf of the children. If there is a bill 
for counseling for the defendant, he should pay it himself. 
29. The defendant should be ordered to pay the obliga-
tions due to MasterCharge and First Security Bank and to hold the 
plaintiff harmless therefrom. 
30. Each of the parties should assume, pay and hold 
the other harmless from any debts or obligations incurred since 
their separation. 
31. Each of the parties should assume and pay their 
own costs and fees as incurred in this matter. 
32. The request of the plaintiff that her fees be paid 
by the defendant should be denied, as she has substantial 
resources of her own to pay her own fees. 
33. The defendant should be ordered to verify that all 
of the checks he testified he has transmitted to the plaintiff 
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shall have cleared the bank and been paid to her. If he deter-
mines that they have not cleared the bank, then, he should be 
ordered to put stop orders against those checks and write 
replacement checks. 
34. Each of the parties should be enjoined and prohib-
ited from physically abusing, harassing, bothering, or attempting 
to intimidate the other in any way, wherever they may be or 
reside. 
35. The court, recognizing that the plaintiff claims 
that the military retirement pay of the defendant is an asset 
which should be divided which is disputed by the defendant who 
contends that the fund is an income stream, not an asset because 
it is being paid to him, and that the court has determined that 
the defendant receives $1,484.00 as retirement pay (upon which tne 
court has set the child support obligation of the defendant in 
light of that obligation as well as the fact that the plaintiff 
has accrued a retirement account through the State of Utah which 
has a present value of $5,129.00 rules final disposition as to an 
award regarding either of the retirement accounts of the parties 
should be reserved until the obligation to pay child support 
terminates. 
36. The court declares that it believes that it has 
divided the property of the parties with/ $87,707.00 being awarded 
to the plaintiff and/$99,913.00 being awarded to the defendant^ 
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and the extra amount has been awarded to the defendant for finan-
cial services provided to the plaintiff and the marital estate. 
37. The court has determined that it should award to 
the plaintiff the funds that she has inherited without counting 
that as
 #part of the marital estate, although the defendant has 
requested that this be included for consideration purposes and 
that part of it, that is, the money that has been earned from the 
inheritance^through the management of the defendant be considered 
as a marital asset. 
DATED this H ^ day of 3^^°^ , 1987. 
KfeNNETH RIGTRUP' V 
District Court Judge 
,~v t i t.~~-> 
H DIXON HSNOLEY 
CLERK 
By /fc^^^/22^-7-
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of 
/yd Fact and Conclusions of Law to the following on this /<y" day of 
September, 1987: 
Ms. Barbara Van Asdlan 
1516 South Wasatch Drive 
Salt Lake Cityy__Utah 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ ^_J 
DSD:080487K 
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DAVID S. DOLOWITZ (0899) 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
FiLED \K O.FRK'S OFP'CE 
Salt Lo->"* r-M -•" • !f?h 
QEC211887 
Deputy C!e 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * 
BARBARA J. MOTES, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PRESTON J. MOTES, 
Defendant. 
% k QL>3 HO bSTl 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. D86-1615 
Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
* * * * * * * * 
The above-entitled matter came before the court for 
trial on Thursday, the 30th day of July, 1987, the Honorable 
Kenneth Rigtrup presiding. The plaintiff was present in person 
and representing herself. The defendant was present in person 
and represented by counsel, David S. Dolowitz. The court dis-
cussed the issues with the parties to see what could be resolved 
by agreement, then heard and considered the testimony of the par-
ties, examined the exhibits offered by the parties, and, being 
advised in the premises, and having made and entered its Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
ETVLIfonr n 
1. Each of the parties is awarded a Decree of Divorce 
from the other, said Decree to become final upon entry. 
2. Care, custody and control of the minor children of 
the parties is awarded to the plaintiff, subject to liberal 
rights of visitation by the defendant, 
3* The defendant and the children shall work out 
their own visitation arrangements upon 24-hour advance notice 
with which the plaintiff shall not interfere. 
4. Each of the parties is enjoined and prohibited 
from de&^^t^g the other to the children or taking any action to 
involve the children in their disputes. Each shall be supportive 
of the other as the parent of the children. 
5. The defendant is ordered to pay the sum of $175.00 
per child per month as child support for each of the children 
until that child attains the age of 18 and graduates from high 
school with his or her age-appropriate class. The defendant is 
enjoined from placing any initials or comments on the checks. 
One-half of tne child support shall be paid on or before the 5th 
of each month and one-half shall be paid on or before the 20th of 
each month. This order regarding child support shall become 
effective August lf 1987. 
6. The defendant^ is awarded the youngest child of the . 
parties, Charissa, as his tax dependent,[^ and the plaintiff * s ^ p ? ? ^ 
ordered to sign all documents required by the Internal Revenue (p*^*} 
Service to effect this award. 
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I. All child support payments from and after the 
entry of the Decree of Divorce in this matter shall be made 
through the clerk of the Salt Lake County Court* 
8. A withhold and deliver order is authorized to be 
executed, should the defendant fall more than 30 days behind in 
the payment of his child support. 
9. Each of the parties is awarded $1.00 per year as 
alimony from the other. 
10. Each of the parties is ordered to retain their 
existing life insurance policies for the minor children of the 
parties until child support for the youngest child terminates. 
II. Each party is ordered to maintain such health, 
accident, dental, orthodontic and hospital insurance as they have 
available to them through their employment for the benefit of the 
minor children of the parties for so long as they may provide 
such insurance protection under the terms and conditions of the 
applicable insurance policies and each is ordered to pay one-half 
of any uninsured medical,/ dental, hospital or orthodontic 
expenses. ^ 
12. The plaintiff should be o&Angod to the name of Van 
Asdlan. 
13. Each of the parties is ordered to sign all docu-
ments and take all actions necessary to effect the provisions of 
this Decree of Divorce. 
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14. The agreement of the parties regarding division of 
their personal property should be accepted by the court and, 
accordingly, the defendant is awarded, and the plaintiff should 
be ordered to deliver to the defendant, the following items: 
a. The bedroom set located in the master bed-
room, including the king-sized bed, chest, dresser, mirrors and 
nightstands; 
b. One of the large down comforters; 
c« His West Point blanket; 
d. The two table lamps with the tripod-type 
base; 
room; 
e. The sofa and loveseat located in the family 
f . The glass-topped table in the family room 
used as an endtable for the sofa; 
g. The clay table lamp on the glass-topped 
table; 
h. The large Sand painting given as a birthday 
present to the defendant; 
i. The Frace eagle over the fireplace; 
j. The Ray Harm eagle print; 
k. The silver West Point plate; 
1. The two pen and ink drawings of Landstuhl; 
m. The West Point print; 
n. The "Old Man" painting; 
p. Six of the etchings; 
q. The Merimbege River painting; 
r. Two of the Hughes paintings; 
s. Two large Sansui speakers; 
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t. Two channel tape drives; 
u. Two Kenwood speakers; 
v, Sansui tuner; 
w. Phonograph turntable; 
x. La Caille tapedeck (two channel); 
y. Two of the three wall clocks; 
z. Apple computer, printer and software; 
aa. The flower set of Franciscan china; 
bb. The Sango china; 
cc. The set of Nachmann whisky beakers; 
dd. The Rosenthal crystal; 
ee. Copper pots and pans; 
ff. Pewterware; 
gg. Table linens to include one of the Army-Navy 
tableclothes; 
hh. Desk in the laundry room; 
ii. The old green table from "Pops;" 
jj. One cardtable with one round piece of glass 
and one rectangular piece; 
kk« The Flokoti rugs and brass samovar; 
11. The National Geographic books and magazines 
and the bookcase in the study; 
mm, Handtools and power tools; 
nn>. The aquarium; 
oo. All of Defendant's personal clothing and 
items, including uniforms; 
pp. All items purchased by Defendant before mar-
riage to include textbooks and records; 
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Germany; 
qq. Remainder of the flatware set; 
rr. Balance of Defendant's business records, 
ss. Large china hutch obtained from P. D. 0. in 
15. The plaintiff is specifically awarded 
a. The Gieol painting; 
b. Two Bassett paintings; 
c* The four-channel tape drive; 
d. Two bookcase speakers (Pioneer); 
e. SANSUI tuner; 
f. Grundig console and six speakers; 
g. AKAI tape deck (larger); 
h. Cassette deck; 
i. One of the three wall clocks; 
j. Pewter candlesticks; 
k. French hutch; 
1. Twelve Hummel figurines; and 
m. 
16, The defendant shall make available to the plain-
One set of tools for use around the house/. ^f^. 
tiff any records that the plaintiff shall request so that they 
can be reproduced on a cassette, *V pyr*4*<k ~pbu, ^ *w^w»»3" cyj^^; 
" 17. Each of the parties is awarded all items of per-
sonal property in his/her possession not hereinabove>specified. 
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18. The defendant is ordered to make available :o the 
plaintiff any pictures, photographs or slides which she wishes 
duplicated and those will be duplicated at her expense. 
19. The plaintiff is awarded all of the accounts of 
the children established with funds from the plaintiff's inheri-
tance and the right and obligation to manage those accounts, and 
the defendant is ordered to take appropriate steps to turn those 
over to the plaintiff. 
20. All right, title and interest in the home on 
Wasatch Drive is awarded to the plaintiff, free of any interest 
of the defendant, subject to her payment of the first mortgage 
and payment of the debt and obligation of approximately $4,000.00 
due to the Pentagon Credit Union and approximately $3,500.00 to 
the Norwest Credit Union. The plaintiff shall be responsible for 
these obligations from and after August 1, 1987, and she is 
ordered to hold the defendant harmless therefrom. 
21. The Trinidad note is awarded to the defendant, 
free and clear of any claim of the plaintiff. 
22. Each of the parties is awarded one of the Horizon 
lots which have no present value. 
23. The defendant is awarded the interest of the par-
ties in the United funds IRA account, the Fidelity Destiny Fund, 
the Wilson-Davis Account; the Army Mutual Aid Insurance Policy, 
the Air Defense Center Savings account, the Air Defense Center 
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checking account, his Pentagon Credit Union account and his First 
Security checking account. 
24. The plaintiff is awarded the Continental IRA 
account, the Magellan fund, the family AT&T stock, and her 
accounts at the University of Utah Credit Union and plaintiff's 
Pentagon Credit Union account. 
25. The defendant is awarded the 1980 Oldsmobile and 
the plaintiff is awarded the 1982 Volvo and the 1986 Jetta. 
26. The/$32,384.00 earned fey^fe^e^lef-g*Ksk 
1
 #>v 
i^ ana^ eme^ b^ e£- the property inherited by the plaintiff is not con-
sidered an asset of the marriage. 
27. The defendant shall obtain from Sears a statement 
of the account balance due as of May 1, 1986. He is credited 
with having paid $140.00 on the account. Each of the parties 
shall be obligated to pay one-half of the account balance as of 
May 1, 1986. If, after deduction of the $140.00 paid by the 
defendant, there is a balance due of less than $140.00, it shall 
be paid by the plaintiff. If the amount due, after credit of the 
$140.00 is more than $140.00, the defendant shall pay that sum to 
the plaintiff or judgment shall be entered in her favor for 
one-half of the balance over $280.00. If the defendant, by pay-
ing $140.00 shall have paid more than one-half of the amount that 
was due on May 1, 1986, the amount by which he has exceeded pay-
ment of one-half of the balance due shall be a credit against the 
child support he shall have been ordered to pay. 
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28, The court heard testimony about the possibility 
that bills for psychological counseling and orthodontic care 
remain unpaid, but evidence was not presented as to amounts which 
were sufficient for the court to make a firm determination. 
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that, if there are orthodon-
tic bills due which have not been paid by insurance, each of the 
parties shall pay one-half of that unpaid balance and one-half of 
any counseling bills incurred for and on behalf of the children* 
If there is a bill for counseling for the defendant, he shall pay 
it himself* 
29. The defendant is ordered to pay the obligations 
due to MasterCharge and First Security Bank and to hold the 
plaintiff harmless therefrom* 
30* Each of the parties shall assume, pay and hold the 
other harmless from any debts or obligations incurred since their 
separation. 
31* Each of the parties shall assume and pay their own 
costs and fees as incurred in this matter* 
32* The request of the plaintiff that her fees be paid 
by the defendant is denied, as she has substantial resources of 
her own to pay her own fees* 
33* The court determined that there was a dispute 
regarding temporary support. The defendant is ordered to verify 
that all of the checks he testified he has transmitted to the 
plaintiff shall have cleared the bank and been paid to her. If 
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he determines that they have not cleared the bank, then, he is 
ordered to put stop orders against those checks and write 
replacement checks. 
34. Each of the parties is enjoined and prohibited 
from physically abusing, harassing, bothering, or attempting to 
intimidate the other in any way, wherever they may be or reside. 
35. The court, recognizing that the plaintiff claims 
that the military retirement pay of the defendant is an asset 
which should be divided which is disputed by the defendant who 
contends that the fund is an income stream., not an asset because 
it is being paid to him, and that the court has determined that
 n 
the defendant receives $1,484.00 as retirement pa^lupon which the 
court has set the child support obligation of the defendant in 
light of that obligation as well as the fact that the plaintiff 
has accrued a retirement account through the State of Utah which 
has a present value of $5,129.00 rules final disposition as to an 
award regarding either of the retirement accounts of the parties 
is reserved until the obligation to pay child support terminates. 
36. The court declares that it ^ believes that it has 
divided the property of the parties withf$87,7u7.00 being awarded 
to the plaintiff and£$99,913.00 being awarded to the defendant^ 
and the extra amount has been awarded to the defendant for finan-
cial services provided to the plaintiff and the marital estate. 
37. The court has determined that it should award to 
the plaintiff the funds that she has inherited without counting 
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that as part of the marital estate, although the defendant has 
requested that this be included for consideration purposes and 
that part of it, that is, the money that has been earned from the 
inheritance!through the management of the defendant be considered 
as a marital asset. 
DATED this ft 
~tf 
day of 4lih^yJ!j^^ , 1987. 
KENNETHRIGTRUP 
District Court Judge 
H. DIXON HINDLEY 
CLERK 
By tfsv^itfb^*; 
- 1 1 -
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Arizona, Art IV(f); id. There is nothing 
in the record to indicate that Arizona au-
thorized this state to entertain Ellis's peti-
tion for a writ of habeas corpus with re-
spect to his transfer to Arizona, indeed 
Ellis attempts to force the hand of Arizona 
by requesting this state to return him to 
the prison facilities there. Such a decision 
would fly in the face of the agency relation-
ship established in the compact Id. 
Ellis must address his request for return 
to the authorities of the state of Arizona, 
and if that state chooses to retain him in 
the Utah facilities until his release, Utah 
courts will not have jurisdiction to rule 
otherwise. His release will have to take 
place in the state of Arizona, with Arizona 
bearing the cost of his return to its territo-
ry, unless Ellis, Arizona, and Utah agree 
upon his release in some other place. Art. 
IV(g). This state is bound by the terms of 
the compact, which makes a decision of the 
sending state in respect of any matter over 
which it retains jurisdiction under art IV(c) 
"conclusive upon and not reviewable within 
the receiving state/' Art. V(a). 
The appeal is dismissed. 
HALL, C.J., HOWE, Associate CJ., 
and DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN, JX, 
concur. 
STEWART, J., concurs in the result 
Barbara J. MOTES, Plaintiff, Appellant, 
and Cross-Respondent, 
v. 




Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Nov. 16, 1989. 
Rehearing Denied Jan. 29, 1990. 
The Third District Court, Salt Lake 
County, Kenneth Rigtrup, J., entered di-
vorce decree. Wife appealed, and husband 
cross-appealed. The Court of Appeals, 
Orme, J., held that (1) court erred in post-
poning apportionment of retired husband's 
military retirement pension, and (2) al-
though court had power to order wife to 
execute forms necessary for husband to 
claim federal tax dependency exemptions 
for one of their children, whose custody 
was awarded to wife, whether such award 
was appropriate use of discretion could not 
be determined, given extensive reassess-
ment of property and support questions 
that trial court might order on remand 
given appellate alteration of pension deci-
sion. 
Reversed in part and remanded. 
1. Divorce <3=>252.3(4) 
Interest in retirement plan accrued 
during marriage is considered marital asset 
subject to equitable distribution upon di-
vorce. 
2. Divorce <3=>252.3(4) 
Postponing equitable distribution of 
husband's retirement benefits for purpose 
of funding higher child support payments 
to wife than would be otherwise appropri-
ate was error, where net effect of such 
approach was to fund husband's support 
obligations through what amounted to ap-
portionment of wife's property; postpone-
ment was also inappropriate because hus-
band had retired and present value of 
wife's share of fixed stream of income 
could be readily calculated and compensat-
ed for with distribution of other assets, 
cash out over comparatively short time or 
provision for wife to receive her share 
monthly. 
3. Divorce <&=>308 
Internal Revenue <$=*3297 
Amendment to Internal Revenue Code 
under which custodial parent is automati 
cally entitled to available dependency ex-
emptions unless custodial parent signs 
written declaration to contrary did not di-
vest state courts of their traditional power 
to allocate federal tax dependency exemp-
tions, and state courts thus have power to 
order custodial parent to execute declara-
tion in favor of noncustodial parent; no 
authority indicates that Congress intended 
to divest state courts of their traditional 
authority and to bestow collateral economic 
benefit on custodial parents. 26 U.S.CA. 
§§ 152, 152(eX2). 
4. Divorce <s=308 
Trial court's power to order custodial 
parent to execute declaration allowing non-
custodial parent to take tax exemption for 
child should be limited to those situations 
where noncustodial parent has higher in-
come and provides majority of support for 
child or children whose exemption is 
claimed—support at level which can be in-
creased as result of reduction in his or her 
tax burdens; it would be abuse of discre-
tion for divorce court to order custodial 
parent to sign off declaration in absence of 
appropriately supported findings to that ef-
fect or demonstration of other exceptional 
circumstances making it in best interest of 
parties and their children that declarations 
be signed. 
MOTES v. MOTES 
a t e as 786 ¥3* 232 (UtaJbApp. 1989) Utah 233 
Kent M. Kasting (argued), Salt Lake 
City, for plaintiff, appellant, and cross-re-
spondent 
David S. Dolowitz (argued), Julie A. 
Bryan, Cohne, Rappaport & Segal, Salt 
Lake City, for defendant, respondent, and 
cross-appellant 
Before BILLINGS, GREENWOOD 
and ORME, JJ. 
OPINION 
ORME, Judge: 
Plaintiff Barbara Motes appeals from th<& 
the trial court's entry of a divorce decree, 
claiming the court erred in postponing th<» 
apportionment of defendant Preston 
Motes's military retirement fund. Plaintiff 
also challenges the court's power to order 
her to execute the forms necessary for 
defendant to claim the federal tax depend-
ency exemption for one of their children 
whose custody was awarded to plaintiff. 
This issue is the primary focus of our opin-
ion. Defendant's cross-appeal concerns the 
profits generated during the marriage 
through his investment and management of 
plaintiffs inheritance. We reverse in part, 
affirm in part, and remand for further pro-
ceedings. 
FACTS 
Plaintiff and defendant were married in 
1967. At that time, defendant was three 
years into his career as a military officer 
and plaintiff was a nurse. During the mar-
riage, defendant obtained a Masters of 
Business Administration degree from the 
University of Utah, and plaintiff secured a 
Bachelor of Science degree in nursing. ,At 
the time this action was filed, defendant 
had retired from the mihtary and was 
working as a financial planner, and plain-
tiff was working as a nursing supervisor 
and attempting to obtain her Master's de-
gree in nursing. Defendant claimed he 
suffered a net loss each month from his 
financial planning work. Plaintiff earned a 
monthly net income of approximately 
$1700. 
At trial, the parties stipulated to the divi-
sion of a large part of the marital property, 
leaving disputes primarily as to the division 
of defendant's military retirement benefits, 
which were generating payments of ap-
proximately $1500 per month; plaintiffs 
retirement fund, which held approximately 
$5100; and plaintiffs substantial inheri-
tance and the additional funds generated 
through investment and growth of the in-
heritance proceeds. 
Following trial, at which plaintiff repre-
sented herself, plaintiff was awarded custo-
dy of the children. The court awarded 
defendant the right to receive the full 
amount of his military retirement during 
the period in which he was to pay child 
support The court reasoned that, absent 
this income, defendant would be unable to 
meet his child support obligations, which 
the court had set based on defendant re-
ceiving the full amount of his monthly re-
tirement benefits. The court determined 
234 Utah 786 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
that the final disposition of both parties' 
retirement accounts would be settled when 
defendant's child support obligations 
ceased, some five years hence. Plaintiff 
was awarded the full amount of her inheri-
tance and the full amount of the invest-
ment income derived therefrom, and defen-
dant was awarded the federal tax depend-
ency exemption for one of the children. 
On appeal, plaintiff argues that the court 
erred in awarding defendant the full 
amount of his monthly military retirement 
benefits, even though for the well-inten-
tioned purpose of enabling defendant to 
satisfy his child support obligations. Plain-
tiff also contends the court exceeded its 
authority in ordering her to execute the 
documents necessary for defendant to 
claim the dependency exemption for one of 
the children on his federal tax return. De-
fendant cross-appeals, seeking a portion of 
those funds he claims to have generated by 
prudently investing plaintiffs inheritance.1 
I. 
RETIREMENT INCOME AND 
INVESTMENT PROCEEDS 
FROM INHERITANCE 
[1] The interest in a retirement plan 
accrued during marriage is considered a 
marital asset subject to equitable distribu-
tion upon divorce. See, e.g., Gardner v. 
Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1078-79 (Utah 
1988); Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 
431, 432 (Utah 1982); Dogu v. Dogu, 652 
R2d 1308, 1310 (Utah 1982); Greene v. 
Greene, 751 P.2d 827, 830-31 (Utah CtApp. 
1988); Maxwell v. Maxwell, 754 P.2d 84, 86 
(Utah CLApp.1988); Bailey v. Bailey, 745 
P.2d 830, 831 (Utah CtApp.1987); Mar-
chant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d 199, 204-05 
(Utah CtApp.1987). The best method for 
distributing or allocating retirement bene-
fits or their value depends on the particular 
circumstances, see Gardner, 748 P.2d at 
1079, but where possible the purpose to 
advance is that of "end[ing] marriage and 
1. The record does not contain a satisfactory 
explanation as to why defendant's claimed fi-
nancial prowess enabled him to so greatly en-
hance the value of plaintiffs inheritance while 
his professional investment activities are so un-
allowpng] the parties to make as much of a 
clean break from each other as is reason-
ably possible." Id. Obviously, postponing 
even a decision on ultimate distribution of 
both retirement plans for some five years 
is inimical to that goal. But see Rayburn 
v. Rayburn, 738 P.2d 238, 241-42 (Utah 
CtApp.1987) (cash-out of one spouse's in-
terest in retirement fund over five-year 
period was acceptable where total value of 
retirement was substantial and installment 
cash-out approach was only alternative to 
longer entanglement).2 Thus, as between 
decreeing a more immediate adjustment or 
simply deferring the other spouse's partic-
ipation until payments are eventually re-
ceived, our Supreme Court has stated that 
the latter "alternative should be employed 
only in rare instances." Gardner, 748 P.2d 
at 1079. Such instances include cases 
"where other assets for equitable distribu-
tion are inadequate or lacking altogether, 
or where no present value can be estab-
lished " Id. (quoting Kikkert v. Kik-
kert, 177 NXSuper. 471, 478, 427 A.2d 76, 
79-80 (1981)). 
[2] However, unlike all but one of the 
cases cited in the preceding paragraph, the 
instant case does not involve the difficult 
questions presented by retirement pro-
grams held by those still working, which 
will—or may—only eventually result in in-
come. In the instant case, like in Greene, 
one spouse had already retired and his re-
tirement benefits had ripened into monthly 
payments, see 751 P.2d at 828, the present 
value of which could be readily ascertained. 
Treatment of such benefits is less proble-
matic than in the usual case. The present 
value of plaintiff's share of the now-fixed 
stream of income, which the benefits have 
become, can be readily calculated and com-
pensated for with distribution of other as-
sets having an equivalent value or cashed 
out over a comparatively short time. That 
failing, provision can simply be made for 
plaintiff to receive her share monthly, the 
successful that his expenses exceed his commis-
sions. 
2. The Rayburn-type treatment was endorsed in 
Gardner. See 748 P.2d at 1079. 
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Instead, the trial court in this case post-
poned the distribution of defendant's retire-
ment benefits for the purpose of funding 
higher child support payments to plaintiff 
than would otherwise have been appropri-
ate. But the net effect of such an ap-
proach is to fund defendant's support obli-
gations through what amounts to an appro-
priation of plaintiffs property. It is no 
answer that the appropriation may be re-
scinded or ameliorated in five years. The 
retirement plans of both parties should 
have been treated as marital assets and 
definitively dealt with in the decree as part 
of an equitable property distribution be-
tween the parties. Accordingly, we re-
verse the court's treatment of both parties' 
retirement funds and remand for distribu-
tion in accordance with the foregoing. 
The collateral effect of our reversing the 
trial court's handling of the parties' retire-
ment plans is that we must also remand f or 
reconsideration the child support award 
and the disposition of proceeds generated 
through the investment of plaintiffs inheri-
tance. From all that appears, the court's 
disposition of these items was inextricably 
linked with its decision to deprive plaintiff 
of participation in defendant's retirement 
fund for at least five years.3 
II. 
FEDERAL TAX DEPENDENCY 
EXEMPTION 
[3] The most significant question this 
case presents & whether a c&Vorce court 
has the authority to award a tax exemption 
to the noncustodial parent by ordering ths 
custodial parent to execute the necessary 
federal tax form- Two prior decisions of 
this court, Fullmer v. Fullmer, 761 P.2<i 
942 (Utah CtApp.1988), and Martinez v. 
i. We do not suggest that it would necessarily be 
inappropriate to award defendant's share of tht 
inheritance profits to plaintiff in exchange for 
retirement benefits to which she would other-
wise be entitled. That may well be an element 
of an equitable overall distribution- See, e.g.t 
Gardner, 748 P.2d at 1079 (one "alternative 
would be reapportionment of the property di$-
MOTES
 v. MOTES 
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See 751 P.2d at Martinez, 754 P.2d 69 (Utah CtApp.), cert 
granted, 765 P 2d 1277 (Utah 1988), dealt 
generally with the Question of dependent 
tax exemptions in the divorce context. 
However, neither involved an actual order 
that the forms be executed. See Fullmer, 
761 P.2d at 949-50; Martinez, 754 P.2d at 
72. Thus, the precise issue is presented to 
us for the first time in this case. 
A. SECTION 152 
Prior to the 1985 tax year, section 152 of 
the Internal Revenue -Code provided that a 
noncustodial parent was entitled to claim a 
dependency exemption in any tax year 
where that parent paid more than $1200 
toward the child's support, and the custodi-
al parent "did not clearly establish that 
[the custodial parent] provided more sup-
port of such child . . . than the parent not 
having custody." This rule apparently cre-
ated recurring headaches for the Internal 
Revenue Service. The usual scenario be-
gan with a noncustodial parent who had 
paid more than $1200 toward the child's 
support, thus meeting the minimal thresh-
old requirement under section 152. How-
ever, the parents were often in disagree-
ment as to which of them had actually paid 
the majority of the child's support It was 
apparently not uncommon for the dispute 
to be "resolved" by both parents claiming 
an exemption for the child on their respec-
tive tax returns. * When this "double-dip-
ping" was detected, the IRS was forced to 
audit both parents' returns and otherwise 
investigate to determine which one actually 
had paid the majority of the child's support 
and was therefore entitled to the dependen-
cy exemption. If nothing else, the situa-
tion amounted in an inefficient expenditure 
of effort by the IRS. 
In 1984, Congress accordingly amended 
section 152 to provide that the custodial 
parent is automatically entitled to the 
available dependency exemptions unless he 
tribution to offset the value of the retirement 
account"). But the court's findings do not es-
tablish that this is what the court did here, at 
least not with any precision. The general ques-
tion of defendant's entitlement to some part of 
the growth of the inherited funds is governed by 
Kiortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304.308 (Utah 
1988). 
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or she "signs a written declaration . . . that 
such custodial parent will not claim such 
child as a dependent" and "the noncustodi-
al parent attaches such written declaration 
to [his or her tax] return...." 26 U.S.C. 
§ 152(e)(2) (1988). 
The issue before us in this case is wheth-
er a state court may order the custodial 
parent to execute the required declaration 
allowing the noncustodial parent to claim 
the exemptions. We hold that state courts 
do retain their traditional authority to allo-
cate dependency exemptions notwithstand-
ing the 1984 amendment. Our conclusion 
is based on an analysis of Congress's intent 
in enacting the 1984 amendment; the lack 
of a provision explicitly divesting state 
courts of their consistently recognized pre-
amendment authority to allocate exemp-
tions; the significant majority of other jur-
isdictions holding that state courts retain 
such authority; and the impracticality and 
irrationality of a contrary ruling. 
B. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT 
Prior to the 1984 amendment, it was uni-
formly held that state courts had authority 
to allocate dependency exemptions in di-
vorce cases.4 See, e.g., Lincoln v. Lincoln, 
155 Ariz. 272, 746 P.2d 13, lfr-17 (CtApp. 
1987); Lorenz v. Lorenz, 166 Mich.App. 58, 
419 N.W.2d 770, 771 (1988); Fudenberg v. 
Molstad, 390 N.W.2d 19, 20 (Minn.Ct.App. 
1986); Cross v. Cross, 363 S.E.2d 449, 456 
(W.Va.1987). Thus, the amendment would 
have to be construed as a substantial de-
parture from prior substantive law for one 
to conclude that state courts do not still 
have this power. This is an unreasonable 
construction of the amendment for two rea-
sons. 
First, the amendment does not expressly 
divest state courts of their traditional pow-
er, "and this silence demonstrates Con-
gress's surpassing indifference to how the 
exemption is allocated as long as the IRS 
doesn't have to do the allocating." Cross, 
363 S.E.2d at 457. Had Congress actually 
*. The pre-amendment allocation was typically 
accomplished by a court order providing that 
the noncustodial parent be entitled to take the 
exemntion if current in child sunnort The 
intended to terminate the established prac-
tice of state courts allocating exemptions, 
"it is more reasonable than not to infer 
that . . . Congress would have said so." Id. 
at 458. See also In re Marriage of Ein-
horn, 178 Ill.App.3d 212, 127 Ill.Dec. 411, 
419, 533 N.E.2d 29, 37 (1988); Wassif v. 
Wassif, 77 Md.App. 750, 551 A.2d 935, 940 
(1989). 
Second, Congress did not intend such a 
result. The 1984 amendment "was meant 
to address the desire of the IRS not to get 
involved in [disputes between parents over 
exemptions] where it had very little, if any-
thing, to gain by the outcome." Wassif, 
551 A.2d at 939. The Congressional record 
supports that characterization of the 
amendment 
The present rules governing the alloca-
tions of the dependency' exemption are 
often subjective and present difficult 
problems of proof and substantiation. 
The Internal Revenue Service becomes 
involved in many disputes between par-
ents who both claim the dependency ex-
emption based on providing support over 
the applicable thresholds. The cost to 
the parties and the Government to re-
solve these disputes is relatively high 
and the Government generally has little 
tax revenue at stake in the outcome. 
The committee wishes to provide more 
certainty by allowing the custodial 
spouse the exemption unless that spouse 
waives his or her right to claim the ex-
emption. Thus, dependency disputes be-
tween parents will be resolved without 
the involvement of the Internal Revenue 
Service* 
H.R.Rep. No. 432, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt 
II, reprinted in 1984 U.S.Code Cong. & 
Admin.News 697, 1140. Following the 
amendment, all the IRS need concern itself 
with when facing a noncustodial parent 
claiming an exemption is whether the cus-
todial parent has executed the requisite 
declaration. See Einhorn, 127 Ill.Dec. at 
419, 533 N.E.2d at 37. The administrative 
"current in child support" proviso was incorpo-
rated into the decree in this case as well, an 
entirely sensible condition. 
ease of such a procedure is obvious, but it 
should be of no concern to the IRS if the 
declaration was executed entirely voluntar-
ily, in accordance with a stipulated settle-
ment, or pursuant to court order. The IRS 
is merely interested in the orderly adminis-
tration of revenue collections, which is en-
hanced by doing away with the "majority 
of support" tes t That test necessitated 
extensive audits by the IRS, while compli-
ance with the signed declaration require-
ment can be ascertained most expediently. 
We are not cited to, nor have we located, 
any authority indicating that Congress in-
tended the 1984 amendment to divest state 
courts of their traditional authority and 
bestow a collateral economic benefit on 
custodial parents. Nor can we identify any 
legitimate policy reason for Congress to 
assert an interest in the division of what is 
tantamount to marital property, a task tra-
ditionally reserved under our federal sys-
tem for each state's domestic relations 
courts. 
In sum, the amendment was merely in-
tended to enhance the administrative con-
venience of the IRS, not to interfere with 
state court prerogatives,5 See, e.g., Fu-
denberg v. Molstad, 390 N.W.2d 19, 21 
(Minn.CtApp.1986); In re Marriage of Mi-
lesnick, 765 P.2d 751, 754 (Mont.1988); 
Pergolski v. Pergolski, 143 Wis.2d 166, 420 
N.W.2d 414, 417 (CtApp.1988). 
C. CASE AUTHORITY 
The vast majority of other jurisdictions 
to confront the issue have concluded that 
state courts retain the authority to order 
the custodial parent to execute the declara-
tion contemplated by the 1984 amendment 
15 Fam.L.Rep. (BNA) 1335 (May 16, 1989); 
5. It is noteworthy that Congress, motivated by a 
desire to minimize administrative problems for 
the IRS, tailored its amendment to reflect a 
presumption that in the typical case, the custodi-
al parent will indeed be the one providing most 
support. If it assumed the routine situation 
would be otherwise, Congress would have pro-
vided that the noncustodial parent would be 
entitled to the exemptions absent a declaration 
from the custodial parent. 
6. It appears that two divisions of the Illinois 
Court of Appeals have split on this issue. See In 
re Marriage of Emery, 179 Ill.App.3d 744, 128 
MOTES v. MOTES 
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In re Marriage of Milesnick, 765 P.2d at 
754. See Lincoln v. Lincoln, 155 Ariz. 
272, 746 P.2d 13, 16-17 (Ct.App.1987); In 
re Marriage of Einhorn, 178 Ill.App.3d 
212, 127 Ill.Dec. 411, 417-19, 533 N.E.2d 
29, 35-37 (1988);6 In re Marriage of Lo-
vetinsky, 418 N.W.2d 88, 90 (Iowa Ct.App. 
1987); Wassif v. Wassif 77 Md.App. 750, 
551 A.2d 935, 939-40 (1989); Fudenberg v. 
Moisted, 390 N.W.2d 19, 21 (Minn.App. 
1986); McKenzie v. Jahnke, 432 N.W.2d 
556, 557 (N.D.1988); Hughes v. Hughes, 35 
Ohio St.3d 165, 518 N.E.2d 1213, 1214-16, 
cert denied, — U.S. , 109 S.Ct 124, 
102 L.Ed.2d 97 (1988); Cross v. Cross, 363 
S.E.2d 449, 456-60 (W.Va.1987); Pergolski, 
420 N.W.2d at 417. See also Jensen v. 
Jensen, 753 P.2d 342, 345 (Nev.1988) (per 
curiam) (a custodial parent can be ordered 
to execute a "waiver" of dependency ex-
emption, but only if a similar result cannot 
be achieved by adjusting alimony and child 
support to achieve after-tax financial pari-
ty). 
We find Hughes, 518 N.E.2d at 1214-17, 
to be particularly compelling. In Hughes, 
the sole issue on appeal was identical to the 
major issue before us here. The majority 
considered at length the purpose for the 
1984 amendment and concluded it was 
made for the administrative convenience 
of the Internal Revenue Service. A do-
mestic relations court has broad discre-
tion to determine the proper mix and 
allocation of marital assets and property 
rights in a divorce proceeding We 
find nothing in the legislative history of 
the [1984 amendment] to support [the] 
theory that new Section 152 was meant 
to encroach upon this exclusive statutory 
power of state courts The only con-
Ill.Dec. 569, 573, 534 N.E.2d 1014, 1018 (1989). 
The analysis in Einhorn is much more compel-
ling. Einhorn carefully analyzes both sides of 
the issue. Emery, on the other hand, disposes 
of the issue in one conclusory paragraph, with-
out even acknowledging the previously decided 
Einhorn opinion or the weight of authority to 
the contrary. Additionally, it is not clear that 
the trial court in Emery had actually ordered the 
custodial parent to execute the necessary decla-
ration. See 128 Ill.Dec. at 573, 534 N.E.2d at 
1018. 
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cern of the IRS, evident from the history 
surrounding the changes, is that only one 
divorced spouse claim and receive the 
deduction. 
Id at 1215-16. In contrast, the Hughes 
dissenters argued that section 152 requires 
a voluntary waiver by the custodial par-
ent, not one compelled by court order. Id 
at 1217 (Wright, J., dissenting). Although 
one can only infer the basis for the Su-
preme Court's denial of certiorari, — U.S. 
, 109 S.Ct 124,102 L.Ed.2d 97 (1988), it 
may be significant that section 152 is not 
couched in terms of a "waiver," but only of 
a "declaration."7 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals has had 
several opportunities to pass on this issue 
and consideration of those cases is also 
instructive. In Valento v. Valento, 385 
N.W.2d 860, 863 (Minn.CtApp.1986), the 
court of appeals held that a lower court 
had not abused its discretion in refusing to 
order the custodial parent to execute a 
section 152 declaration. Id However, by 
considering the refusal on its merits in-
stead of simply holding the lower court had 
no authority to do otherwise, the court of 
appeals implicitly concluded that state 
courts do have authority to allocate depend-
ency exemptions notwithstanding the 1984 
amendment. This position was clarified by 
the court a few months later in Fudenberg 
v. Molstad, 390 N.W.2d 19 (Minn.CtApp. 
1986). In that case, the court first ana-
lyzed the legislative history of the amend-
ment and, citing Valento, concluded that 
"[s]tate court allocation of the exemption 
does not interfere with Congressional in-
tent Thus, allocation of the exemption 
is permissible." 390 N.W.2d at 21. Ac-
cordingly, the case was remanded to the 
lower court wh^ ch had previously ruled it 
had no authority to allocate the exemption. 
See also Theroux v. Boehmler, 410 N.W.2d 
354, 358 (Minn.Ct.App.1987) (because trial 
court did not expressly order custodial 
spouse to execute waiver, its allocation of 
7. There are at least three reasons for the Su-
preme Court to have granted certiorari in 
Hughes if it felt the case was wrongly decided. 
First, the case exclusively involves the interpre-
tation of federal law; second, a few state courts 
have adopted a different interpretation, one 
the dependency exemptions to noncustodial 
spouse was ineffective); Gerardy v. Gerar-
dy, 406 N.W.2d 10, 14 (Minn.CtApp.1987) 
(same); Thesing v. Thesing, 390 N.W.2d 
469, 472 (Minn.Ct.App.1986) (trial court 
erred in holding it had no power to require 
custodial spouse to execute declaration; 
case remanded for reconsideration). 
There is admittedly a split of authority 
on this question and a minority of courts 
considering the issue have held that the 
1984 amendment divests state courts of 
their traditional authority to allocate de-
pendency exemptions and that state courts 
may not order custodial parents to execute 
section 152 declarations. 15 Fam.L.Rep. 
(BNA) 1335 (May 16, 1989). See McKenzie 
v. Kinsey, 532 So.2d 98, 100 (Fla.DistCt. 
App.1988); Lorenz v. Lorenz, 166 Mich. 
App. 58, 419 N.W.2d 770, 771-72 (1988); 
Gleason v. Michlitsch, 82 Or.App. 688, 728 
P.2d 965, 967 (1986); Sarver v. Dathe, 439 
N.W.2d 548, 551-52 (S.D.1989); Davis v. 
Fair, 707 S.W.2d 711, 717-18 (Tex.Ct.App. 
1986). Cases following the minority view 
are unpersuasive for at least two reasons. 
First, these cases recognize, as they 
must, that a dependency exemption gener-
ally provides a financial benefit to the par-
ent entitled to claim it in the form of re-
duced income taxes. See, e.g., Sarver, 439 
N.W.2d at 552. Thus, courts must consider 
which parent will receive this benefit in 
setting child support and alimony. At least 
three courts have even gone so far as to 
remand cases where the exemption was 
held on appeal to have been improperly 
awarded to the noncustodial parent, recom-
mending that the trial court reduce the 
previously awarded child support and ali-
mony in light of the noncustodial parent's 
loss of this financial benefit See Lorenz, 
419 N.W.2d at 772; Sarver, 439 N.W. at 
552; Davis, 707 S.W.2d at 718. This re-
sult, while unavoidable under the minority 
view, is bizarre, with dependent children 
the ultimate victims. As pointed out quite 
consistent with that espoused by the dissenters 
in Hughes, thus creating a split in authority, 
and third, the issue involves substantial policy 
questions and implicates the division of power 
under our federal scheme. 
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convincingly in Cross, 363 S.E.2d at 458-59, 
the minority view forces state courts to 
achieve financial parity indirectly, by down-
wardly adjusting otherwise appropriate ali-
mony and child support, rather than achiev-
ing parity directly, by sensibly allocating 
the exemptions. 
Second, these cases are lacking in 
thoughtful or disciplined analysis. For ex-
ample, the Florida Court of Appeals rejects 
Cross and its progeny because "deductions 
and exemptions . . . are not to be extended 
beyond the clear import of the language 
used." McKenzie, 532 So.2d at 100 n. 3. 
However, as pointed out above, section 152 
merely grants the noncustodial parent the 
right to an exemption if he or she secures a 
declaration from the custodial parent Sec-
tion 152 is absolutely silent as to whether 
or not state courts may direct the custodial 
parent to execute the declaration as part of 
its overall disposition. Thus, the McKenzie 
court offends the very theory it purports to 
uphold by imposing prohibitions on state 
courts which are not expressly or impliedly 
imposed by section 152. 
Similarly, in Gleason, 728 P.2d at 967, 
the Oregon Court of Appeals concludes, 
without analysis, that "p]n the circum-
stances here, the court should not have 
designated which party would receive the 
dependency exemption." Gleason obvious-
ly ignores the rationale of the more recent 
cases rejecting its conclusion, and in this 
light, its one-sentence, conclusory holding 
is not very compelling. Finally, we find 
Justice Neely*s criticism of Davis, 707 
S.W.2d 711, to be perceptive, as well as 
colorful. See Cross, 363 S.E.2d at 458r-60. 
Justice Neely concludes that "Davis v. 
Fair is an extremely formalists opinion 
that strains at a gnat but swallows a cam-
el." 363 S.E.2d at 458. 
D. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
State divorce courts must always recog-
nize the financial benefit accompanying de-
pendency exemptions when awarding ali-
mony and child support. However, income 
tax exemptions are only valuable to per-
sons with income, and up to a certain point, 
the higher the income the more valuable 
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the financial benefit, given the progressivi-
ty of the federal income tax. Cross, 363 
S.E.2d at 460. Prohibiting state courts 
from allocating the available exemptions to 
the parent receiving the greatest economic 
benefit often results in the unnecessary 
depletion of limited family resources. 
[4] Thus, use of the power to order a 
custodial parent to execute a section 152 
declaration should not be used to evenly or 
otherwise divide the available exemptions 
without regard to the particular economic 
realities. On the contrary, it should be 
limited to those situations where the non-
custodial parent has the higher income and 
provides the majority of support for the 
child or children whose exemption is 
claimed—support at a level which can be 
increased as a result of a reduction in his 
or her tax burdens. Indeed, it would be an 
abuse of discretion for a divorce court to 
order a custodial parent to sign the declara-
tion in the absence of appropriately sup-
ported findings to that effect or demon-
strating other exceptional circumstances 
making it in the best interest of the parties 
and their children that the declarations be 
signed. The declarations are not to be 
used as a kind of "consolation prize" for 
parents who are losing daily association 
with their children. Moreover, by ordering 
the custodial parent to execute the declara-
tion, the court actually gives the custodial 
parent a tool to compel timely support pay-
ments. The court's order should provide 
that the duty to execute the declaration at 
the end of each year is contingent on the 
noncustodial parent being current in sup-
port payments. See also note 4, supra. 
The custodial parent may then rightfully 
refuse to execute the declaration if support 
payments are owing, thereby creating an 
economic incentive for the noncustodial 
parent to comply with his or her support 
obligations. 
As observed in Sarver, "[t]his is not a 
question . . . of 'overridpng] federal tax 
law' or 'unconstitutional meddling with 
Congressional authority.' It is simply a 
matter of determining and preserving the 
most resources in situations of obvious lim-
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ited resources/' 439 N.W.2d at 554 (Sa-
bers, J., specially concurring). 
E. CONCLUSION 
In summary, we conclude the 1984 
amendment to section 152 does not divest 
state courts of their traditional power to 
allocate federal tax dependency exemp-
tions, and state courts have the power to 
order a custodial parent to execute a decla-
ration in favor of the noncustodial parent 
The contrary position followed by only a 
minority of jurisdictions was not intended 
by Congress, especially given the lack of an 
express termination of the traditional ap-
proach of state courts to dependency-ex-
emption allocation. Finally, the practical 
effect of a contrary ruling would essential-
ly prevent state courts from taking permis-
sible advantage of progressive tax brackets 
and maximizing the resources available to 
support divorcing parents and their fami-
lies. All of that having been said, the 
power to order execution of a section 152 
declaration should be cautiously and pru-
dently used, with the sole objective of max-
imizing the financial resources available to 
the "family" unit 
The court in this case had the requisite 
judicial power to direct plaintiff to execute 
the section 152 declaration for defendant's 
benefit as an aspect of its overall property 
distribution. Whether or not that disposi-
tion was an appropriate exercise of discre-
tion need not be decided in view of the 
extensive reassessment of property and 
support questions which will occur on re-
mand. In the process of that reassess-
ment, appropriate disposition of the tax 
exemptions, and the question of any related 
orders concerning execution of section 152 
declarations, will depend on the economic 
realities which emerge and must be in ac-
cordance with the views expressed in this 
opinion. 
The parties shall bear their own costs 
and attorney fees incurred on appeal. 
BILLINGS and GREENWOOD, JJ.; 
ORDER DENYING PETITION 
FOR REHEARING 
The court having fully considered the 
petition for rehearing filed herein by appel-
lant now orders as follows: 
1. The petition is denied. 
2. In concluding Section I of its opinion 
with a provision for "remand for reconsid-
eration" of various aspects of the trial 
court's decree, this court meant not to sug-
gest any particular outcome following re-
consideration. Rather, the court merely 
recognized that its alteration of pivotal por-
tions of the trial court's decree may neces-
sitate reassessment and adjustment of oth-
er portions of the decree and that the trial 
court had the authority to reconsider its 
decree in light of this court's opinion and 
make such adjustments in its decree as 
may be necessary to achieve an equitable 
overall result See also Halladay v. Cluff, 
739 P.2d 643, 645 n. 5, (Utah CtApp.1987) 
("Trial courts are in a much better position 
to evaluate an entire case, including its 
nuances and undisclosed pitfalls, than an 
appellate court. It is for this reason that 
where, as in this case, all possible ramifica-
tions of a decision on appeal may not be 
readily apparent, a case will be remanded 
for such proceedings as are appropriate in 
view of the guidance offered in the opin-
ion."). 
3. Likewise, nothing in this court's opin-
ion should be taken to limit the trial court's 
ability to adapt its decree to the existing 
facts and circumstances of the parties and 
to the parties' reliance on the initial decree 
and their compliance therewith, nor to 
make such adjustments and incorporate 
such credits and offsets as may be appro-
priate. 
